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EBOLA, THE WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, AND BEYOND:
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
HEALTH SECURITY
O’NEILL INSTITUTE
The O’Neill Institute for National
and Global Health Law at
Georgetown University was
established to respond to the need
for innovative solutions to the most
pressing national and international
health concerns. Housed at the
Georgetown University Law Center
in Washington D.C., the O’Neill
Institute reflects the importance
of public and private law in health
policy analysis. The essential
vision for the O’Neill Institute rests
upon the proposition that the law
has been, and will remain,
a fundamental tool for solving
critical health problems in our
global, national, and local communities. By contributing to a more
powerful and deeper understanding of the multiple ways in which
law can be used to improve health,
the O’Neill Institute hopes to
encourage key decision-makers in
the public, private, and civil society
sectors to employ the law as a
positive tool to enable individuals and populations in the United
States and throughout the world to
lead healthier lives. For
additional information, please visit
www.oneillinstitute.org.

The West African Ebola epidemic has taken over
11,000 lives. By contrast, AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria together kill approximately 3.5 million
people every year. Given the relatively low death
toll, why has Ebola changed the paradigm for global
health security? There are no fewer than four global
commissions to learn the lessons of Ebola—the
United Nations, the World Health Organization
(WHO), the National Academy of Sciences, and the
independent panel by Harvard and the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
The United Nations has convened a high-level panel on the
Global Response to Health Crises. Chaired by the President
of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, and drawing on the lessons of
Ebola, the panel will recommend ways to strengthen national
and global systems to prevent and manage health crises in a
report to the Secretary-General in December 2015. The WHO
panel, convened in March, has already issued an interim report.
Meanwhile, the US Global Health Security Agenda continues
apace, with funds now being disbursed, such as a $15 million
three-year commitment to Cameroon. On June 7-8, Angela
Merkel will host the G7 summit, with global health security at
the top of the agenda.
The reason for the intense search for a new global health
framework is that an entirely preventable epidemic reached
exponential growth in the world’s poorest region, with key
global health actors such as the WHO failing badly in their
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leadership functions. Although Liberia has been Ebola free for several months, Ebola activity in
Guinea and Sierra Leone has become more intense since May 10, when the region saw cases hit a
10-month low.
The World Health Assembly (WHA) this year was critically important to the future of the WHO.
The 68th Assembly did act to improve global health security, but it failed to address the deep
structural problems facing the Organization. It set in motion a reform agenda but if it does
not meet global expectations, it could threaten the WHO’s legitimacy for a generation. Given
the high stakes, what did the Assembly actually decide, is the reform likely to transform its
ability to function effectively, and what did the Assembly entirely ignore to the detriment of the
Organization?
The WHA took four major steps to shore up its epidemic response: combine its outbreak and
emergency response programs; create a $100 million emergency contingency fund; develop
a new global health emergency workforce; and launch a reform process for the International
Health Regulations (IHR). Here, we assess the strengths and weaknesses of these proposals. More
importantly, we explain what the Assembly has not done, which is to address the deep structural
problems that have plagued WHO for decades.
INTEGRATING WHO’S OUTBREAK AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAMS

Margaret Chan, the WHO Director-General, announced plans to create a single in-house
program for health emergencies, combining the existing outbreak and emergency response units.
The Assembly went further, asking the Secretariat to “unite and direct all WHO outbreak and
emergency response operations … under the direct supervision of the Director-General.”
The fact that outbreak and emergency response fell under separate organizational structures in
the Secretariat was incoherent, as these need to be seamless functions. The new combined unit
will be designed for speed and flexibility, with program performance benchmarks “showing what
must happen within 24, 48, and 72 hours, not months,” according to Dr. Chan. The new unit will
partner with United Nations agencies, states, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such
as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).
From an organizational perspective, the new unit would be more rational and designed for rapid
response. Yet, there are no new funding sources to support outbreak and emergency response.
If Dr. Chan were to shift funding from her core budget for epidemic response, she risks further
weakening already badly underfunded programs such as for non-communicable diseases and
mental health.
The WHO is not known for moving at the speed that outbreaks require. Will the new unit
be different? Or will the WHO need to take one more step, establishing the unit as a semiautonomous structure? Only days before the WHA, German Chancellor Angela Merkel
proposed a semi-autonomous entity within the WHO with dedicated funding, a high degree
of independence, an external advisory board, and its own director, who would report to the
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Director-General. Outside the ordinary WHO structures and committed to transparency, it
would be freer to frankly assess how states were meeting their responsibilities under the IHR.
Such an approach has something to offer, combining the WHO’s credibility with ministries of
health, global relationships, and IHR responsibilities with an independence that mitigates the
political obstacles and bureaucratic processes that can hinder WHO action. The various postEbola review committees should give it serious consideration.
THE GLOBAL HEALTH EMERGENCY WORKFORCE

The absence of a robust domestic workforce represented a signal failure of the West African Ebola
response. The 3 post-conflict countries – Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone – had among the
world’s lowest health worker-to-patient ratios, and lost more than 500 doctors, nurses, and other
health workers to the epidemic. Although NGOs such as MSF and foreign workers filled some of
the gap, the paucity of human resources significantly impeded the response.
The Organization is doing very little to build human resource capacities in low and middle
income countries, which would be far more effective at preventing, detecting, and responding
to future outbreaks. However, the Assembly endorsed the D-G’s plan to launch a global health
emergency workforce, reporting back to the Executive Board on progress in January 2016,
a function consistent with Article 2(d) of its Constitution: “to furnish appropriate technical
assistance and, in emergencies, necessary aid upon the request or acceptance of Governments.”
The new outbreak and emergency response unit will coordinate the emergency workforce, drawn
from existing networks including the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN),
the Global Health Cluster, foreign medical teams, and NGOs. The D-G also announced that
WHO is strengthening its own emergency staff, adding logisticians, medical anthropologists, and
experts in risk communication.
What the Ebola response vividly demonstrated is that an effective response requires a range of
human resources: clinicians (e.g., doctors, nurses, and community health workers), public health
professionals (e.g., to conduct surveillance, laboratory analysis, and contact tracing), and experts
in communications, culture, and behavior to gain insight into local belief systems. These work
skills need to be ensured through comprehensive training and certification, which will be crucial
to the success of the workforce reserve.
A global health workforce cannot be effective unless barriers to their effective deployment are
dismantled. It will be important to ensure that visas for foreign workers are expedited and permits
are issued rapidly to allow entry of essential medical and humanitarian supplies. At the same time,
it will be necessary to ensure that health workers have adequate supplies of personal protective
equipment, essential medicines, and well functioning clinics. If they fall ill, there is an ethical duty
to provide the most effective available treatment and, if necessary, medical evacuation. Despite
the critical importance of training, medical supplies, and logistics, the WHO is implementing the
emergency workforce without any new dedicated funds. It is hard to conceive how such a vital
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operation can be conducted without a major injection of sustainable resources.
Done right and properly resourced, a global health public workforce will be much more than a
mechanism for global outbreak response. Training for the global health workforce would bolster
countries’ capacities to deal with national and regional epidemics. Well-trained health workers
would serve their communities, being deployed elsewhere only when needed to quell a major
outbreak.
THE AFRICAN CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

The African Union (AU), with 54 member states, is about to launch the African Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (ACDC) with the US CDC’s technical assistance. The West
African Ebola epidemic became the tipping point for the formation of the ACDC, based initially
at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. It will coordinate pan-African research on public health
threats, and reinforce countries’ capacities for preventing and responding to outbreaks, including
a rapid response force. A logical role of a new ACDC would also be to bolster local response
capacities.
The ACDC is expected to launch soon, likely next month, with a mandate that encompasses
just this – improving countries’ ability to prevent and respond to epidemics, such as through a
continental rapid-response force – along with providing health data and coordinating research on
public health threats in Africa. Yet with a budget of $6.9 million for its first 18 months and only
11 staff, its mission vastly exceeds its own capacity.
This mismatch between mission and resources has echoes of the African Public Health
Emergency Fund, which last year began disbursements to countries to help them respond to
public health emergencies, including disease outbreaks and natural and manmade disasters. Yet
while the fund began seeking $50 million per year from its members beginning in 2012, it had
less than $4 million by mid-2014. While there are more resources within Africa that can and
should be mobilized, the international community ought to provide more support to both these
initiatives.
A $100 MILLION EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY FUND

In 2011, the independent WHO Review Committee on IHR functioning in the aftermath
of the Influenza H1N1 pandemic proposed a $100 million contingency fund. Even though
the Committee found that the world is “ill-prepared” for a major epidemic, the WHO never
adopted its recommendation. The D-G’s strategy was to mobilize international funding when an
emergency strikes, believing that rich states and philanthropists would react quickly to exigent
circumstances. Yet, the Organization should have realized that once a rapidly moving infectious
disease emerges, it would be too late to first begin resource mobilization. That turned out to be
the case with Ebola, as WHO appeals for funding took too long to materialize.
Article 58 of WHO’s Constitution stipulates that a special fund to be used at the discretion of
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the Executive Board shall be established to meet emergencies and unforeseen contingencies.
Following Ebola, the Organization plans to launch a “specific, replenishable contingency fund
… with a target capitalization of $100 million.” Notably, the fund will be financed by flexible
voluntary contributions, but not additional core funding through mandatory assessed dues. The
contingency fund, while vitally important, appears to be too little. If one considers the billions of
dollars in humanitarian assistance and the anticipated loss of approximately 12% of the GDP in
2015 alone in the most affected countries, $100 million seems incommensurate with the need.
The trigger point for deployment of the fund is also important. The D-G was heavily criticized
for delays in declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) under
IHR. Wisely, release of the contingency fund would not be tied to a PHEIC declaration. Instead,
the agency plans to use the Emergency Response Framework grading system as the trigger for
drawing down the contingency fund. For example, the fund could be deployed following the
designation of a grade 2 emergency under the Framework, or the trigger point may be more
dynamic and flexible. The Assembly ultimately left the decision to the D-G to determine when to
deploy the emergency fund.
To be effective, a contingency fund must be commensurate with the need, sustainable, available
for rapid use, and of global reach. The goal of a WHO contingency fund should be to prevent
an event from escalating into a PHEIC or a Grade 2 or 3 emergency. Yet, the size of the fund, as
suggested above, is too low, particularly for events that are not stopped in their early phases, and
it requires voluntary contributions from member states or other donors. Adding new resources to
the WHO’s core budget would have been more viable and sustainable.
Meanwhile, having proposed what would be a potentially significantly larger source of funding
to respond to an outbreak, the World Bank continues to hold discussions about the Pandemic
Emergency Facility (PEF) with a range of partners, including WHO, governments and other
development partners, and the private sector. The Bank envisions PEF as a mechanism to prevent
epidemic outbreaks from becoming pandemics, channeling funds to all actors that are part of the
response, including WHO, UN agencies, governments, and NGOs. It would follow an insurance
model, aiming to incentivize countries to develop the capacities they require to prevent and
respond to outbreaks, such as by linking premium payments to the degree to which countries
have met their obligations under the IHR.
With World Bank President Jim Kim keen on the possibilities of this new financing mechanism
and convinced of its urgency – including the need to have it up and financed before the next
major outbreak strikes – we can expect to learn more details soon, such as the size of the fund,
when it expects to become operational, and exactly how it will be structured to encourage
preparedness even as it funds emergency responses. The linkage between preparedness and
premiums would have to be designed in a way to ensure that the countries with the fewest
resources to develop core capacities aren’t penalized with higher premiums, yet while still
encouraging these countries to develop these capacities even as funds come largely from wealthier
nations.
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THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS

The IHR are the key international legal instrument for governing outbreaks of international
concern, including core capacities to detect, assess, notify, and respond to potential global health
emergencies. Yet, the Ebola epidemic revealed deep flaws in IHR compliance and effectiveness.
The 68th Assembly directed the D-G to establish an IHR review committee to assess their
functioning, transparency, effectiveness and efficiency. Despite well-understood deficiencies,
however, the Assembly took no decision on IHR reforms and allocated no resources to supporting
IHR implementation. Here are the critical choices for fundamental IHR reform:

Core capacities. The IHR require states to develop core health system capacities, yet only about a
third have done so: among 196 states parties, only 64 informed the Secretariat that they achieved
these core capacities, 81 requested extensions, and 48 did not even communicate their status or
intentions. Beyond failure to meet critical capacities, the IHR allow states to self-assess, without
any independent evaluation. The IHR should be amended to require states to invest in building
capacities, and require WHO to rigorously evaluate their performance.
Transparency and accountability. The D-G did not declare a PHEIC until 4 ½ months after
the international spread of Ebola was first detected, and well over a month after MSF called for
a “massive deployment of resources.” Leaked internal documents demonstrated that the D-G
was under political pressure not to declare an emergency. The composition and deliberations
of the IHR committee that advises the D-G are not disclosed, undermining the transparency
and public accountability required of an international organization. Three reforms are required
to insulate the D-G from political constraints and to open the process to greater scrutiny. First,
instead of an all-or-nothing declaration of a PHEIC, there should be a graduated response as an
outbreak becomes ever more serious. Second, there should be open disclosure of IHR committee
deliberations. Third, an independent “shadow” committee should be developed to advise the D-G,
particularly on when to convene the formal IHR committee.
IHR recommendations. When the D-G declares a PHEIC, she is required to make
recommendations to member states. In past global emergencies Dr. Chan asked states to develop
capacities to respond, and cautioned against overreactions, such as bans on travel and trade and
the use of quarantines. Yet, the H1N1 and Ebola emergencies demonstrated that states routinely
ignore IHR recommendations. There are no incentives, no compliance mechanisms, and the D-G
does not single out states that fail to adhere to their international obligations. The IHR need to be
reformed to create compliance-enhancing features, such as public evaluations of compliance and
potential sanctions for failure to implement IHR recommendations.
DEEPER STRUCTURAL REFORMS NEEDED

There are at least three major structural deficiencies at WHO that has been widely known. Yet, the
Assembly did nothing to change the agency’s underlying fundamentals.

Budget and assessed dues. The WHO 2016/17 budget will be $4.385 billion, a 10.3% increase
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over the previous biennium. This level is wholly incommensurate with its worldwide mandate,
lower than the budget of major hospitals in the United States. In the proposed budget, moreover,
mandatory assessed dues remain at their 2012/13 level, representing zero nominal growth, and
account for just 21% of the program budget. Voluntary contributions by member states and large
donors (e.g., the Gates Foundation) account for the remaining 79%. The WHO’s budget, therefore,
is not only inadequate to meet global health needs, but the D-G controls a small portion of her
budget so that external donors influence the Organization’s priorities and action agenda. No
agency can operate when it has so little control over its work program.

Worldwide incoherence. During the Ebola outbreak, WHO headquarters and the African
Regional Office (AFRO) were in tension, with AFRO and African country offices sometimes
blocking visas for foreign aid workers and failing to rapidly issue permits to offload critical
medical supplies. If the WHO is to fulfill its constitutional mandate to lead and coordinate the
global response, there needs to be greater coherence between the Organization’s different levels.
Yet the Assembly did not alter the method of appointing the Regional Director or put in place
concrete reforms to ensure greater worldwide coherence in operations.
Civil society engagement. Although the Secretariat is exploring new ways to harness the
creativity of civil society and avoiding conflicts of interest with vested business interests, the
Assembly did not address governance reforms. The Global Fund, GAVI Alliance, and UNAIDS
all include civil society in their governance decisions, but the WHO remains an outlier. What the
AIDS experience taught us is that harnessing the creativity and advocacy of civil society can lead
to transformational change.
I propose that the Assembly create a special Chief Operating Officer to report on fundamental
reform of the Organization’s funding, governance, and civil society engagement. It is clear that the
D-G is too politically influenced by member states to take the bold decisions needed to belatedly
bring the WHO into the 21st century and assure its future.
Without this kind of push from the outside, the WHO’s future leadership is not assured. To be
sure, the Organization has improved its ability to put out fires in the form of rapidly emerging
infectious diseases. Although there is a better fire brigade, there is precious little the Assembly has
done to prevent fires from erupting with ever-greater frequency in every region of the globe

